Avian influenza continues to take its toll in southeast Asia. A rise in the number of human cases (as of March 10, 60 cases, 42 deaths), the possibility of further unreported cases, and suggestions of person-to-person transmission, have put the international health community on high alert that a new human influenza pandemic may be just around the corner.

Epidemiologists and public-health specialists from 52 European member states of the WHO, plus experts from Australia and Canada, met in Luxembourg (March 2--3) to discuss their national influenza pandemic preparedness plans. 31 countries have a plan, and the rest either have a draft plan, or intend to develop one (submitted plans can be found on the WHO website). The wide variation in the plans reflect the cultural and historical differences that exist among countries in Europe, as well as their diversity in size, wealth, and complexity. No country is 100% prepared. Overall it was clear that, apart from a handful of countries, the impact of a pandemic in most countries would be devastating.

In terms of preparing for an emergency, galvanising political commitment to secure funds and resources is a major obstacle. The Netherlands and Canada have been lucky to capitalise on their experiences of avian influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), respectively, thereby securing continued political momentum. Risk assessment research has certainly been useful to push the UK plan up the political agenda. Peer pressure from neighbouring countries who have a plan can also influence governments of countries who are not prepared.

Concerns about surveillance were most notable among the countries of the former Soviet Union, who are used to a very data-rich surveillance environment. Surveillance data also seemed to be secondary-care dominated, with much of the data derived from hospitalised patients and no emphasis on primary care. A number of countries also lack their own reference laboratories and diagnostic facilities. This is an area for WHO EURO to tackle, and the new European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, to help these countries partner with other agencies.

Preventing the spread of disease in the community raised the most interest. Stockpiling of antivirals and orders for vaccines have begun in some countries, but their use and availability are complicated by a lack of scientific research. One contentious issue, for example, is the priority in which risk-groups should receive treatment and prophylaxis. For countries that cannot afford drugs and vaccines, more evaluation of alternative interventions such as interferons and stimulating non-specific innate immunity would be useful. The effectiveness of masks should also be looked at. Modelling studies of different interventions would be a valuable public-health tool to ensure an optimal response during a pandemic.

Traditional public-health measures such as social distancing and quarantine were seen as the best tools for containment in eastern European countries. However, western Europe is more reluctant to adapt these approaches because the scientific basis of their effectiveness is lacking. Legal and ethical considerations are also a barrier to the imposition of quarantine orders in some countries.

All countries were in agreement that maintaining health services was a top priority and that systems needed to be in place to cope with surge capacity. Seen as a big challenge is the need for intersectoral planning involving partners outside the health sector such as agriculture, transport, trade, labour, and the judiciary at multiple levels of government. Fostering these crucial cross-discipline relations will be key to sustaining the pandemic response.

Good communication at all levels is essential in the event of a pandemic. The public need to be informed quickly in the event of a threatening situation, and communication channels with neighbouring countries should be established.

It is impossible to anticipate when the next pandemic might occur, or how severe its consequences might be. We should keep in mind that although the events in Asia are driving nations to think about influenza pandemic planning, the focus should not solely be on H5 at the expense of other influenza subtypes such as H2 or H7, which are just as likely to produce the next pandemic. Much of today\'s preparedness planning is being developed in the absence of scientific data. We should take this opportunity in the inter-pandemic period to generate better evidence-based policy so that we are in a stronger position to respond.
